Three days after it began, Israel’s operation in Rafah looks like a microcosm of its seven-month-long fight in Gaza: an attempt to check a tactical box rather than a strategic move with a definitive goal in the fight against Hamas.
As a limited incursion, it could be the least of Israel’s bad options, and even prove successful if it helps achieve a more favorable hostage deal or a cease-fire agreement. However, judging by the war’s conduct to date, it’s more likely that the operation will, in the end, backfire.
So far, the Israel Defense Forces has ordered the evacuation in the eastern outskirts of the city, taken over a two-mile-long section of the so-called Philadelphi Corridor along Gaza’s border with Egypt and occupied the Gaza side of the Rafah crossing, which is not actually in the city of Rafah.
The stated goal of the operation is to wrest control of the Rafah crossing to Egypt from Hamas to stop the smuggling of arms and goods that can be used for military purposes, to carry out targeted raids and to weaken Hamas’s ability to siphon off humanitarian aid. Taking the crossing also removes Hamas control over a lifeline to the outside world and an international border — a strong symbol of sovereignty. In addition, Israel hopes that the operation will pressure Hamas to agree to a better hostage deal, which would bring about the return at least initially of all living women, elderly and injured men.
But the risk of the operation spinning out of control outweighs the likelihood of that rosiest outcome.
First, the operation has quickly brought tense Israeli-Egyptian ties to their lowest point. The risk of a diplomatic rift is imminent. Egypt clearly fears that the operation itself or a Hamas attack on the border fence could lead to an exodus of tens of thousands of Gazans into Sinai. Even short of this worst-case scenario, Egypt was reportedly furious at the unchecked behavior of I.D.F. troops on the other side of the crossing after they took it over on Tuesday, such as hoisting Israeli flags.
Second, the operation has worsened the humanitarian disaster in Gaza, with Israel telling some 100,000 people to leave for their safety. The Muwasi region where they have been ordered to go lacks enough infrastructure and supplies for a lengthy stay. In addition, the closing of the Rafah crossing hurts efforts to improve the conditions for people in Gaza, severely limiting the number of trucks carrying food and other necessities allowed in. With Israel now controlling all crossings into Gaza, it is now Israel that will be held accountable, even if Hamas attacks aid convoys and infrastructure. Having been blamed for starving children in Gaza, Israel cannot afford even a slight humanitarian deterioration, nor can Gazans.
Third, even if the limited military campaign in Rafah is successful in destroying Hamas, without a strategy and realistic vision for postwar Gaza that supports a revitalized Palestinian Authority and links Gaza with the West Bank, any achievements will be short-lived. Hamas has resurged in the northern part of the Strip after the I.D.F. withdrew, precisely because Israel failed to connect its military campaign to a political and diplomatic plan. Without such a plan, the Rafah operation risks becoming yet another tactical failure in the war.
Finally, the operation could lead Hamas to harden its positions, thinking that time is on its side. With global public opinion already against Israel, additional civilian casualties and humanitarian suffering would pressure Israel further, forcing it to agree to a cease-fire under unfavorable conditions. Because Hamas sees the hostages as an insurance policy for its leadership survival, it is far from certain that the current military pressure will make its release of hostages more likely.
If Hamas does not compromise soon, Israel may expand the operation into a full invasion, inflicting massive destruction and casualties in Gaza, and increasing international condemnation at a time when Israel is facing diplomatic pressure on many sides.
On Friday, the U.N. General Assembly may hold a symbolic vote on recommending that Palestine be declared a de facto state. Israel is also facing a genocide case at the International Court of Justice and possible issuance of arrest warrants by the International Criminal Court for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other top officials. The United States last week put on hold an arms shipment to Israel. At least five other countries — Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain — have had halted weapons sales to Israel. Several countries have cuts ties with Israel or recalled an ambassador, and Turkey has halted trade with it.
There is of course one person in Israel that the incursion benefits: Mr. Netanyahu. For more than three months he has rhetorically hammered away at Rafah as the last bastion of Hamas’s military presence and promised an invasion.
This operation is Mr. Netanyahu’s attempt to square the circle. On the one hand, he seeks to cater to his political base and appease his coalition partners, who both expect him to deliver on his promise to achieve “total victory” that includes annihilation of Hamas as a military and governing force. On the other hand, he does not want to fully ignore the Biden administration’s veto on going into Rafah or give the impression that he is not completely engaged in ongoing negotiations to free Israeli hostages. Mr. Netanyahu’s solution is to invade Rafah without actually invading Rafah.
This is where Mr. Netanyahu’s personal interests diverge from his country’s. One widely held view in Israel is that since Oct. 7 he has sought to prolong the war, including at the expense of the hostages. A continuing war delays a sweeping national investigation commission into the failures that led to the Oct. 7 massacre as well as delaying elections, which will most likely bring an end to Mr. Netanyahu’s tenure.
Hopefully, the Rafah incursion is not another delaying tactic, but rather a real attempt at obtaining a better hostage deal. The jury is still out. But the only viable way to avert the incursion’s failure is by keeping it limited and linking military achievements to political aims by creating a day-after vision that offers a nonviolent alternative to Hamas. Mr. Netanyahu must view Rafah as a means to larger ends, rather than an end in itself.
Dr. Shira Efron is the Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation senior director of policy research at the Israel Policy Forum. She previously led the Israel Program at the RAND Corporation and was a consultant with the United Nations in Jerusalem on Gaza access issues.
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